**Strategy and RFD:**

*Excuse the gendered language, I recognize when my opponent is a woman. I read this aff. Allie read a deontological case based on the benefits and burdens of society and proportional punishment, and made arguments as to why the resolution is a question of the aim of punishment. She dumped on the framework and read a rule consequentialism off-case that recontextualized my framework. The 1ar was four minutes of turns and defense on the neg case. The nr was extensions, including framework to exclude aff arguments, cross-applications from the off-case, and answering my turns. The 2ar was extending weighing off of the turns and explaining why my offense linked, and why she could only get offense off the neg case. Oliver Gappmayer voted aff off the weighing on the turns and the defense on neg offense. The aff and the turns are below. The weighing with the turns was mostly with Roebuck, saying that the neg actively violates the balance of society while the aff just omits to rebalance society.*

**PART 1 IS THE PARADIGM**

The NFL rules state that LD consists of “parallel burdens,” thus my burden is to prove the world under the maxim of the resolution is more desirable than the maxim of the converse of the resolution. Prefer this paradigm because truth testing explodes neg ground because there are infinite ways to prove a statement false. **This means that neg must defend one post-fiat advocacy that defends all retribution. Means no counterplans.**

**PART 2 IS THEORY**

1. Evaluate procedural interps read by neg as a reason to drop the argument if they indeit an affirmative interp or practice **(A)** neg can always run theory, key to deterring theory abuse which supercedes theory debate and **(B)** aff has only 4 minutes to respond to 7 minutes so aff can’t cover theory and substance, which also justifies an aff RVI.

2. I will concede reasonable neg interps if they’re read to me in cx. You don’t have to read them, but I’m warning you now. This meta-theory interp is best for substance education because it tries to avoid abuse and the theory debate.

**PART 3 IS OBSERVATIONS**

1. The Encyclopedia of Criminal Justice defines rehabilitation as “**Punishment intended to reform a convict so that [he or] she can lead a** productive **life** **free from crime**.”[[1]](#footnote--1) Retribution is “**Punishment for** bad conduct, **criminal actions**, etc., typically considered **in terms of** redress or **repaying a debt to society**; the avenging of wrong deeds, etc.; vengeance; an instance of this. Also: punishment regarded as an expression of divine will; a punitive act.”[[2]](#footnote-0) “Criminal justice system” as “the system of law enforcement that is involved in… incarcerating those suspected of criminal conduct.”

Prefer this definition because it comes from a contextualized source.

2. Crime is a large cause of death in the U.S. FBI data[[3]](#footnote-1) shows about 15,000 murders committed in the U.S. in 2011 – **this is the impact to crime.**

**PART 4 IS THE FRAMEWORK**

The Online Etymology Dictionary[[4]](#footnote-2) says

**[The main modern use of ought is]** As an auxiliary verb **expressing** duty or **obligation** ~~(~~c.1175, the main modern use), it represents the past subjunctive.

Because common usage is what gives words meaning, I value **obligations**. The resolution questions the obligations of the USFG **(A)** only the USFG has power over the criminal justice system **(B)** key to debatability, whether a policy or mindset, our debate is moot if we use an actor who can’t influence the res and **(C)** “ought” always refers to an action, even when used as “ought to be.” **Prichard 12**[[5]](#footnote-3)

But this argument, if it is to restore the sense of obligation to act, must presuppose an intermediate link, viz., the further thesis that what is good ought to be. The necessity of this link is obvious. An "ought," if it is to be derived at all, can only be derived from another "ought." Moreover this link tacitly presupposes another, viz., that **the apprehension that something good, *which is not an action,* ought to be involves** just **the feeling of** imperativeness or **obligation which is to be aroused *by the thought of the action*** which will originate it. Otherwise the argument will not lead us to feel the obligation to produce it by the action. And, surely, both this link and its implication are false.[1](http://www.ditext.com/prichard/mistake.html#1) **The word "ought" refers to** actions and to **actions alone**. The proper language is never "So and so ought to be," but "I ought to do so and so." **Even if we** are sometimes moved to **say** that the world or something in it is not what **it ought to be**, what **we really mean** is **that** God or **some human** being **has not made some thing what he ought to have made it.** And it is merely stating another side of this fact to urge that **we can only feel the** imperativeness upon us **[obligation] of something which is in our power**; for it is actions and **actions alone** which, directly at least, **are** **in our power.**

And, governments are obligated to maximize observable endssince they only know generalities and can’t focus on individuals. **Goodin 90**[[6]](#footnote-4)

My larger argument turns on the proposition that there is something special about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more probable for them than private individuals. Before proceeding with the large argument, I must therefore say what it is that makes it so special about public officials and their situations that make it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism. Consider, first, the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty , and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices – public and private alike – are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices, but that is all. That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus – assuming they want to use it at all – to chose general rules or conduct.

Thus the standard is **Maximizing Expected Lives of US Citizens.**

There are three more independent warrants:

1. Ends-based theories are the best theoretically because they force Topic Education – We have to use empirics and analytics to evaluate the consequences our actions have on the real world, which forces us to research the effects of actions and how those effects will come about, thus learning more about the topic. Education is the terminal impact of debate and the only reason why debate gets school funding, so always prefer the most educational value criterion on a theoretical level.

2. Value is contingent upon experiencing that value, which means all moral theories reduce to ends. **Harris**

I believe that we will increasingly understand good and evil, right and wrong, in scientific terms, because moral concerns translate into *facts* about how our thoughts and behaviors affect the well-being of conscious creatures like ourselves. If there are facts to be known about the well-being of such creatures—and there are—then there must be right and wrong answers to moral questions. Students of philosophy will notice that this commits me to some form of moral realism (viz. moral claims can really be true or false) and some form of consequentialism (viz. the rightness of an act depends on how it impacts the well-being of conscious creatures). While moral realism and consequentialism have both come under pressure in philosophical circles, they have the virtue of corresponding to many of our intuitions about how the world works. Here is my (consequentialist) starting point: **all questions of value** (right and wrong, good and evil, etc.) **depend upon the possibility of experiencing such value**. **Without** potential **consequences at the level of experience**—happiness, suffering, joy, despair, etc. —**all talk of value is empty.** Therefore, **to say that an act is moral**ly necessary, or evil, or blameless, **is to make** (tacit) **claims about its consequences in the lives of** conscious **creatures** (whether actual or potential).I am unaware of any interesting exception to this rule. Needless to say, if one is worried about pleasing God or His angels, this assumes that such invisible entities are conscious (in some sense) and cognizant of human behavior. It also generally assumes that it is possible to suffer their wrath or enjoy their approval, either in this world or the world to come. Even within religion, therefore, consequences and conscious states remain the foundation of all values.

Puts his theory in the double bind, either (a) we experience it and it reduces to consequences, or (b) we don’t experience it and it has no effect on us.

3. Maximizing life comes prior to any other ethical evaluation. **Rasmussen**[[7]](#footnote-5)

In so far as one chooses, regardless of the choice, one must choose (value) man's life. **It makes no sense to value some X without also valuing that which makes the valuing of X possible** ~: notice that this is different from saying "that which makes X possible"). If one lets X be equivalent to "death" or "the greatest happiness for the greatest number," one is able to have such a valuation only because of the precondition of being a living being. **Given that life is a necessary condition for valuation, there is no other way we can value something without also** (implicitly at least) **valuing [life].**that which makes valuation possible.

**PART 5 IS THE NET BENEFITS: I ADVOCATE THE TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION.**

**Contention 1: Rehab minimizes crime**

**First,** Restorative justice comparatively minimizes recidivism. **Latimer**[[8]](#footnote-6)

**The overall mean effect size for the 32 tests** that examined the effectiveness of restorative justice programming **in reducing offender recidivism was** +0.07 **(+7%)** (SD=.13) **with a 95 percent confidence** interval of +0.12 to +0.02. Although the effect sizes ranged from +0.38 to -0.23, more than two thirds of the effect sizes were positive (72%). In other words, **restorative** **justice programs, on average, yielded reductions in recidivism compared to non-restorative approaches to criminal behaviour**. In fact, **compared to** the comparison/ control **groups that did not participate in** a **restorative justice** program, **offenders in the treatment groups were significantly more successful during the followup periods** (t (31) = 2.88, p < 0.01).

Prefer this study:

1. It cross-paneled data for over 32 tests, providing an accurate result.
2. My study was conducted over 25 years so no temporal bias.
3. My study conducts a follow-up period, which is key to make sure that the impact sticks.

**Second,** Conclusions from 302 meta-meta analyses show that rehabilitation interventions are successful in decreasing problem behaviors. **Cullen**:[[9]](#footnote-7)

**Hundreds of studies of** the effects of various **rehabilitation** treatments on recidivism **have been** conducted with both juvenile and adult offenders in community-based and residential correctional programs. The findings of those studies, in turn, have been **examined in numerous meta-analyses**. Some of these overlap in the studies they cover, and some researchers have contributed more than one meta-analysis. At the same time, there is **[with] considerable diversity in** the meta-analytic **approaches [so]** and techniques used and **the[re’s] potential for** different meta-analyses to reach **different conclusions**. Our purpose here is to take a broad overview of virtually all the existing meta-analyses on rehabilitation treatments as a way to appraise the current state of evidence about their effectiveness for reducing recidivism. The most general result available from these meta-analyses is an estimate of the over- all mean effect size across diverse samples of studies of different rehabilitation treatments Most of their mean effect sizes **[they] represent recidivism reductions** in the **20**% range, vary-ing upward **to** nearly **40%.** It is especially no- table that **there is no overlap in the range of** mean **effect** sizes found in meta-analysis **of rehab**ilitation treatment **and** that found for meta-analyses of the effects of **sanctions** and supervision (Table 1). The smallest mean recidivism effect size found in any meta- analysis of a general collection of rehabilitation studies is bigger than the largest one found in any meta-analysis of the effects of sanctions.

Prefer the Cullen meta-analysis independently:

1. it’s comparative with control groups which solves for other causalities.
2. study indicates it analyzed *all* meta-analysis data in the field so it’s the only way to resolve disputing conclusions, also provides a mean-analysis for all of the lit. This means that Cullen didn’t cherry-pick studies and that it’s the best OVERALL finding.
3. If there’s any methodology debate default this study because meta-meta studies are the only way to test to solve for methodological differences and how they affect a study’s outcome.

FORCE INDICTS TO BE SPECIFIC – He might get up and read a lot of reasons why meta-analysis sucks but that’s not a reason why THIS study sucks.

And deterrence fails; your studies methodologies don’t take into account real world factors. Valerie ’10:[[10]](#footnote-8)

Another problem in assessing deterrence is that in order for sanctions to deter, potential offenders must be aware of sanction risks and consequences before they commit an offense. In this regard, research illustrates that **the** general **public** tends to **underestimate[s] the severity of sanctions** generally **imposed. [since they’re]** 3, 4 This is not surprising given that members of the public are **often unaware of the** specifics of **sentencing policies. Potential offenders are** also **unlikely to be aware of modifications to sentencing policies, thus diminishing any deterrent effect.**

This means that **even if** he wins his study it’s not an accurate predictor for real-world effects because those same controlled conditions will never be emulated.

**Contention 2: Decreased Crime Increases Soft Power**

Crime kills international credibility, UN reporters confirm. **Falk**[[11]](#footnote-9)

This unabashed avowal of imperial goals is the main thesis of the article, perhaps most graphically expressed in the following words: "**The U**nited **S**tates **can** increase the effectiveness of its military forces and **make** the world safe for soft power, America's inherent comparative advantage." As the glove fits the hand, **soft power** complements hard power within the wider enterprise of transforming the world in the United States' image, or at least in the ideal version of the United States' sense of self.

The authors acknowledge (rather parenthetically) that **their strategy may not work if the US continues** much longer **to be seen unfavourably abroad as a national abode** **of** drugs, **crime**, **[and] violence**, fiscal irresponsibility, family breakdown, and political gridlock. They make a rather meaningless plea to restore "a healthy democracy" at home as a prelude to the heavy lifting of democratising the world, but they do not pretend medical knowledge, and offer no prescriptions for restoring the health of the American body politic. And now, 16 years after their article appeared, it would appear that the adage, "disease unknown, cure unknown", applies.

And, International credibility is key to allies, solves multiple scenarios for extinction. **Nye and Armitage**[[12]](#footnote-10)

Soft power is the ability to attract people to our side without coercion. **Legitimacy is central to soft power**. If a people or nation believes American objectives to be legitimate, we are more likely to persuade them to follow our lead without using threats and bribes. Legitimacy can **[and] also reduce[s] opposition** **to**—and the costs of—using **hard power** when the situation demands. Appealing to others’ values, interests, and preferences can, in certain circumstances, replace the dependence on carrots and sticks. Cooperation is always a matter of degree, and it is profoundly influenced by attraction. This is evident in the changing nature of conflict today, including in Iraq and against al Qaeda.

In traditional conflict, once the enemy is vanquished militarily, he is likely to sue for peace. But many of the organizations against which we are fighting control no territory, hold few assets, and sprout new leaders for each one that is killed. Victory in the traditional sense is elusive. Militaries are well suited to defeating states, but they are often poor instruments to fight ideas. Today, **victory depends on attracting** foreign **populations** **to** **our** **side** and helping them to build capable, democratic states. Soft power is essential to winning the peace. It is easier to attract people to democracy than to coerce them to be democratic. Since America rose on the world stage in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it has wielded a distinctive blend of hard and soft power. Despite nineteenth-century military adventures in the Western hemisphere and in the Philippines, the U.S. military has not been put in the service of building a colonial empire in the manner of European militaries. Particularly since World War II, America has sought to promote rules and order in a world in which life continues to be nasty, brutish, and short for the majority of inhabitants. American sources of soft power are plentiful. Soft power is more than mere cultural power, although the appeal of Hollywood and American products can play a role in inspiring the dreams and desires of others. Sources include the political values and ideas enshrined in the Constitution and Bill of Rights, U.S. economic and educational systems, personal contacts and exchanges, and our somewhat reluctant participation and leadership in institutions that help shape the global agenda. **One of the biggest sources of U.S. soft power is** quite simply **America’s** obvious **success as a nation**. Not everyone looks forward to a more interconnected and tolerant world. These ideas can be threatening to those who consider their way of life to be under siege by the West. Those who feel this divide most strongly are often the very people who seek to fight America and its allies. Yet every year the United States attracts more than four times the number of immigrants than any other country, and hundreds of thousands of foreign scholars and students as well. America’s history as an immigrant nation is an important source of its soft power. There is an enormous strength and vitality in the American civic spirit of opportunity, tolerance, mutual respect, and shared commitment and in an economy that rewards innovation and hard work. For people everywhere, the United States can be a partner for a better life.

Smart power is neither hard nor soft—it is the skillful combination of both. Smart power means developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve American objectives, drawing on both hard and soft power. It is an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels to expand American influence and establish the legitimacy of American action. Providing for the global good is central to this effort because it helps America reconcile its overwhelming power with the rest of the world’s interests and values. Elements of this approach exist today in U.S. foreign policy, but they lack a cohesive rationale and institutional grounding. Three main obstacles exist. First, U.S. foreign policy has tended to over-rely on hard power because it is the most direct and CSIS COMMISSION ON Smart Power visible source of American strength. The Pentagon is the best trained and best resourced arm of the federal government. As a result, it tends to fill every void, even those that civilian instruments should fill. America must retain its military superiority, but in today’s context, there are limits to what hard power can achieve on its own. Second, U.S. foreign policy is still struggling to develop soft power instruments. Diplomatic tools and foreign assistance are often directed toward states, which increasingly compete for power with non-state actors within their borders. Diplomacy and foreign assistance are often underfunded and underused. These tools are neglected in part because of the difficulty of demonstrating their short-term impact on critical challenges. Figure 1 shows U.S. spending on international affairs over the past 20 years. Note that funding was generally stagnant for a decade. Increases in the early 1990s—due primarily to economic aid to Eastern and Central Europe—were offset by reductions in development assistance and public diplomacy funding. Increases from 1999 to 2002 were driven in part by security concerns following the embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar el Salaam. Recent increases are on account of support to critical countries in the war on terror, the Millennium Challenge Corporation and PEPFAR initiatives, and humanitarian emergencies. It should come as no surprise that some of the best-funded and most appreciated soft power tools have been humanitarian operations carried out by the U.S. military such as tsunami relief in Southeast Asia and the earthquake response in Pakistan, since these operations produced results that were clear, measurable, and unassailable. Wielding soft power is especially difficult, however, because many of America’s soft power resources lie outside of government in the private sector and civil society, in its bilateral alliances, or through its participation in multilateral institutions. Third, U.S. foreign policy institutions are fractured and compartmentalized. Coordination, where there is any, happens either at a relatively low level or else at the very highest levels of government— both typically in crisis settings that drive out long-range planning. Stovepiped institutional cultures inhibit joint action. More thought should also be put into sequencing and integrating hard and soft power instruments, particularly in the same operating theater. Some elements of this approach are already occurring in the conduct of ongoing counterinsurgency, nation building, and counterterrorism operations— tasks that depend critically but only partially on hard power. The United States has in its past wielded hard and soft power in concert, with each contributing a necessary component to a larger aim. We used hard power to deter the Soviet Union during the Cold War and soft power to rebuild Japan and Europe with the Marshall Plan and to establish institutions and norms that have become the core of the international system. Today’s context presents a unique set of challenges, however, and requires a new way of thinking about American power.

The twenty-first century presents a number of unique foreign policy challenges for today’s decisionmakers. These challenges exist at an international, transnational, and global level. Despite America’s status as the lone global power and concerns about the durability of the current international order, America should renew its commitment to the current order and help find a way for today’s norms and institutions to accommodate rising powers that may hold a different set of principles and values. Furthermore, even countries invested in the current order may waver in their commitment to take action to minimize the threats posed by violent non-state actors and regional powers who challenge this order. The information age has heightened political consciousness, but also made political groupings less cohesive. **Small**, adaptable, transnational **networks have access to tools of destruction** **that are** increasingly cheap, easy to conceal, and **more** readily **available**. Although the integration of the global economy has brought tremendous benefits, **threats such as pandemic disease and the collapse of financial markets** are more distributed and more likely to **arise without warning**. The threat of widespread physical harm to the planet posed by nuclear catastrophe has existed for half a century, though the realization of the threat will become more likely as the number of nuclear weapons states increases. The potential security **challenges posed by climate change raise** the possibility of an entirely **new set of threats** for the United States **to consider**. The next administration will need a strategy that speaks to each of these challenges. Whatever specific approach it decides to take, two principles will be certain: First, an extra dollar spent on hard power will not necessarily bring an extra dollar’s worth of security. It is difficult to know how to invest wisely when there is not a budget based on a strategy that specifies trade-offs among instruments. Moreover, hard power capabilities are a necessary but insufficient guarantee of security in today’s context. Second, success and failure will turn on the ability to win new allies and strengthen old ones both in government and civil society. **The key is** not how many enemies the United States kills, but how many **allies** it grows. States and non-state actors who improve their ability to draw in allies will gain competitive advantages in today’s environment. **Those who alienate potential friends will stand at greater risk**. China has invested in its soft power to ensure access to resources and to ensure against efforts to undermine its military modernization. Terrorists depend on their ability to attract support from the crowd at least as much as their ability to destroy the enemy’s will to fight.

Credibility outweighs other scenarios because (a) the card indicates that it controls the internal link, other existential threats can be solved with allies and (b) The U.S. can solve for most harms such as economic collapse through government action and executive orders, but the impacts I’ve illustrated operate outside government control – meaning a stronger strength of link to the impact.

**AND,** Extinction precedes ethics. **Bostrom[[13]](#footnote-11)**Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. **We may not now know**— at least not in concrete detail—**what outcomes [are moral]** would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that **there** **is** a great *option* ***value*****in** **preserving**— and ideally improving—**our ability to recognize value and to steer the future [in] accord**ingly. **Ensuring** that there will be **a** **future** version of **humanity** with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely **is** plausibly **the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain** a lot of **value**. To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe.

This means that if another ethic is presented that we default to extinction, which outweighs because it’s the only way to ensure an action has value, making it a prerequisite to moral systems. This does NOT mean extinction comes first under util, if I win util we can still weigh.

**Contention 3: The Democratic Will**

**(A)** Studies show people support rehab. **Hart**[[14]](#footnote-12)Americans strongly favor rehabilitation and reentry programs over incapacitation as the best method of ensuring public safety. Nearly **two-thirds of all Americans** (66%) **agree** that **the best way to reduce crime is to rehabilitate prisoners** by requiring education and job training so they have the tools to turn away from a life of crime, while just one in three (28%) believe that keeping criminals off the streets through long prison sentences would be the more effective alternative.¶ **This idea has** broad-based **support**, **with** solid majorities of whites (63% / 31%), fundamentalist Protestants (55% / 36%), and **Republicans** (55% / 38%) supporting rehabilitation over incapacitation as the best way to reduce crime. Interestingly, the 23% of **Americans who report that they** or a close family member **have been the victim of a violent crime endorse rehabilitation** even more strongly than the general public, **by a** decisive **73 to 21% margin**.

Prefer this because of A) Reverse bias- Republicans have a long history of supporting punitive measures so the shift shows broad support and B) Breadth of support. Every group interviewed supported rehab over retribution.

**Link turns politics**, my ev shows that rehabilitation has much more support. Also outweighs his link ev **(a)** Politics link ev is written by members of the political arena which is subject to extreme bias **(b)** He just asserts his claim whereas I warrant my claim with statistical data and **(c)** My ev includes specifics like Republican support, which is key to the political arena.

**Contention 3 is competitiveness**

Education for prisoners is the core of the topic. **Chlup 05**[[15]](#footnote-13)

The amount and type of education offered in corrections seem to change depending on the approach and philosophy to corrections that are dominant at the time. **Historic links between prison reform and corrections education show that when a punitive approach** (“lock them up and throw away the key”) **is ascendant, educational programming is de-emphasized**. Instead inmates may spend 17 hours a day locked in their cells, with one hour a day outside for exercise (Prison Activist Resource Center, retrieved May 16, 2004). At present, this approach is followed by several correctional institutions. **This model differs from** **a rehabilitative approach** **in which sentencing is viewed as** the punishment and **time spent in** correctional institutions focuses on rehabilitation, counseling, overcoming addictions, acquiring vocational skills, and **academic learning**. Earlier reformatory models sought to take a Progressive Era, rehabilitative approach (Gehring, 1995).

And, increasing opportunities to receive education is uniquely key to solve for declining US economic competitiveness.

**Cooper et al.-12**[[16]](#footnote-14)

Competition from rapidly growing countries such as China and India are changing business norms and the links between national economies. We are quite familiar with what economists call “global labor arbitrage,” the substitution of high-wage workers in advanced economy countries with low-wage workers in developing economies. That’s led to a global re-ordering of production, jobs, and growth.

More recently, technological advances in telecommunications and transportation, as well as **skills development** in the developing world, **are dragging** more U.S. **industries**—including computer programming, high-tech manufacturing, and service sectors—**into** international **competition.** **This** development **is feeding a** mounting **demand for high-skilled labor** around the world.

To position the United States for the future, substantial investments are needed in research, infrastructure, and education. The most important of these areas to address is education. Why? Because as this report shows, the **overwhelming economic evidence points to education**—and human capital investments, generally—**as the key drivers of** economic **competitiveness** in the long term.

Harvard University economist Gregory Mankiw, for example, has shown that in advanced countries such as the United States, human capital investment had three times the positive effect on economic growth as did physical investment. And educational investment is particularly important in early childhood development and learning, according to growth economists. The return on investment from interventions such as prenatal care and early childhood programs is higher than for virtually any class of financial assets over time, according to Nobel Prize winning economist James Heckman.

The academic **literature** **also shows that** **failing** **to provide** broad **opportunities for** nurturing, **learning**, and productive development **harms economic growth** **and** national **competitiveness**.

And, education for prisoners is key to improving the pool of skilled workers in America. **Buzzini 09**[[17]](#footnote-15)

**When an inmate is** first **released** from prison, it is not as if his (or her—women’s prisons are growing just as fast, perhaps even more rapidly than men’s) can simply go on as before. For example, if the inmate was making an honest income, he may no longer be welcome at his previous work due to his ex-con, or felon, status. **The job market might restrict him to jobs** that keep him below the poverty line, unable to take proper care of himself and his family. On the other hand, many offenders serving time today are in for mandatory drug sentencing. These offenders may be tempted to return to their drug-slinging ways, but not fear repercussions doubly, especially if they are closing in on a three-strikes scenario (after which some states require a life sentence). But how should a youth fresh from the inside be expected to get a job with an eighth-grade reading level and no skills in math, history, science, the arts, or even communication and basic socialization? “Ex-cons are often woefully unequipped to make it in the legit world. Prison education dramatically improves the odds. Studies have shown a 30 to 70 percent reduction in recidivism rates for those who get some higher education” (Leder 1). Also, higher education from inside the prison walls allowed graduates better job opportunities. **A study** from the 1980s **shows that** 60 to **75 percent of inmates who** pursued (and **graduated from**) **higher education during their sentence** **were able to find a job**, **compared to only 40 percent** of inmates **without a degree** (Taylor “Pell grants”), Jon More Taylor, who writes prolifically on the topic of inmate education, has been featured in a number of journals, including the Correctional Education Association’s own publication, the *Journal of Correctional Education.* Taylor himself is three-time prison grad, earning his A.A., his B.S., and his M.A. from a PSCE program at his own prison. He has also received two journalism awards for his efforts (“Jon Mane Taylor”). Taylor knows the processs in and out from his own struggles to find alternative sources for funding. He explains that college programs for inmates “off-set the social stigma attached to ex-con status” (Taylor “Pell Grants”). This stigma is off-set due to the fact that education acts as an actual rehabilitator. “There have been enough studies now that show high school graduation and [post-secondary] job preparation is a magical number. When people achieve those levels while incarcerated, there’s a much different rate of recidivism, employability, and success than those people who don’t,” says the executive director of the CEA, Stephen Steurer. Even former president Bill Clinton believed that these programs offer a good service at a reasonable price. He “opposed both the Wynn and Gordon amendments, backing Pell Grants to prisoners as rehabilitation.”

And, competitiveness decline tanks US military strength. **Baru 09**[[18]](#footnote-16)

Hence, economic policies and performance do have strategic consequences.2 In the modern era, the idea that strong economic performance is the foundation of power was argued most persuasively by historian Paul Kennedy. **'Victory** (in war)', Kennedy claimed, **'has** repeatedly **gone to the side with more** flourishing **productive base'**.3 Drawing attention to the inter**relationships** **between** economic **wealth**, technological innovation, **and the ability** of states **to** efficiently **mobilize economic** and technological **resources for power projection** **and national defence**, Kennedy argued that nations that were able to better combine military and economic strength scored over others. 'The fact remains', Kennedy argued, 'that all of the major shifts in the world's military-power balance have followed alterations in the productive balances; and further, that the rising and falling of the various empires and states in the international system has been confirmed by the outcomes of the major Great Power wars, where victory has always gone to the side with the greatest material resources'.4 In Kennedy's view, **the** geopolitical **consequences of an economic** crisis, or even **decline**, **would be transmitted through a nation's inability** **to** find adequate financial resources to simultaneously **sustain economic growth and military power**, the classic 'guns versus butter' dilemma.

And, American military strength solves extinction. **Barnett 11**[[19]](#footnote-17)

Events in Libya are a further reminder for Americans that we stand at a crossroads in our continuing evolution as the world's sole full-service superpower. Unfortunately, we are increasingly seeking change without cost, and shirking from risk because we are tired of the responsibility. We don't know who we are anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains to us. Barack Obama would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens alike have concluded that he is actually beset by [strategic incoherence](http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/974/how-not-to-stop-a-rogue-regime-the-case-of-libya) -- in effect, a man overmatched by the job.   It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II.  Let me be more blunt: As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. **Had America been removed from** the global dynamics that governed **the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended**. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable **there would** now **be no** identifiable human **civilization** **left**, **once** **nuclear** **weapons** **entered** **the** killing **equation**.  **But** the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, **America** stepped up and **changed** **everything** **by** ushering in our now-perpetual **great-power peace**. We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What **resulted** **was** the collapse of empires, an **explosion of democracy**, the persistent **spread of human rights**, the liberation of women, the **doubling of life expectancy**, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP **and** a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts.  That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure.   With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as [the Facebook revolutions](http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8089/the-realist-prism-politics-vs-social-media-in-the-arab-uprising) erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head.  The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these calculations suggest **a 90 percent** absolute **drop [in deaths] and a 99 percent** relative **drop in deaths due to war**.   We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by **[American power allows] multipolarity**, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come.  To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism. America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding.

And, heg turns don’t link (a) my impacts are specific to American heg, which is utilized differently and (b) I control the internal link, American heg allows multipolarity.

**1ar**

**(\_\_) Turn:** Committing a crime harms the criminal because they disobey society’s moral codes.  The social balance is tipped *against* the offender if valuing social cooperation and human worth are important. **Falls**

Falls, M. Margaret.  *Retribution, Reciprocity, and Respect for Persons.* Law and Philosophy, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Apr., 1987), pp. 25-51.

Within  the  moral tradition of  which  I  speak,  the  principle of  reciprocity  fails to  make rational sense of the jus talionis: **there is no  profit  for punishment  to  remove  for the sake of  reestablishing  the  equilibrium  of  burdens and  benefits. There  are**, admittedly, **both  benefits and burdens of law;** and fairness may even dictate the moral  principle for  which  Socrates argues  in  the  Crito.One  who  has  benefitted from the state's laws may acquire  an obligation  to obey  the  state's laws in return. **If,** however**, doing evil harms the evildoer, then  even the burden of obedience**, if  accepted,  **is** actually **a benefit,** indeed  a greater benefit than the benefit of  others' noninterference in one's  life. **Criminals in  failing  to take up  their burden lose** what is eminent-  ly valuable, namely, willing  **the morally good, and** hence **are** actually **less well off than those who obey.** My  first criticism, then, is that **the  theory of  reciprocity does not  work from within the tradition that  says willing  the moral good  is the  highest human good** and therefore doing  evil  harms the  evildoer.  Readers who  dismiss this tradition as anachronistic and  rationally  indefensible will  think  "so much  the  better" for  the  reciprocity  theory. Yet, the tradition and its perspective  on punishment  cannot so  easily be discarded.  Even  those  who  doubt  the  metaphysical  tenets  supporting  the  tradition that  says  evildoers harm themselves should be slow to grant  some  of  what must be  granted  **if  one  is to  maintain that there is  intrinsic profit  to  criminal wrongdoing**. **One must acknowledge,** for  example,  **that the unpunished rapist  is really better off than men and  women who** resist the  temptation  or **feel no  temptation  to  rape.** Also **one has to  reject** seemingly healthy and **reasonable emotions generally  felt towards criminals** as  inappropriate  or at least as misleading and  based on illusions.Amidst our anger at a Charles Manson or a Lizzie  Borden, we  feel  a mixture of  disgust, pity,  and horror -  disgust at  what  they allowed themselves to become, pity over what  they have  done to themselves in becoming that, and horror that becoming  such  is a possibility  for each of  us. These are not the  emotions we  have  towards someone who  has gained an advantage over us; and while to some these emotions may  seem the residue of  a  fairytale-picture  of  humanity,  their  strength and intuitive  appropriateness  should make us  slow  to  accept  the  reciprocity theory's view.  Finally,  to  use  the  reciprocity theory's justification of punishment  one must be willing  to  accept  the message  it  expresses. Joel Feinberg has argued persuasively  that when, what, and how  we  punish expresses society's values.12 So  does the justification which  society gives  for  punishing. Using  the  theory  of  reciprocity says  to  criminals that  they  were  correct in  thinking  that crime benefits, that doing evil is a good  if only you can  get away with it.

**Thus,** we should rehabilitate the criminal to allow them to function as a peaceful

member of society. Only rehab corrects social inbalance.

**(\_\_) Turn:** Retribution is inconsistent with respect for human worth because some acts are categorically forbidden, but retributive punishment requires these prohibited acts.  **Falls**

Falls, M. Margaret.  *Retribution, Reciprocity, and Respect for Persons.* Law and Philosophy, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Apr., 1987), pp. 25-51.

The first criticism finds conflict between the  theory of  reciprocity  and  something outside it, a particular moral tradition. My  second concerns  an  incoherence within the  theory  itself  The**reciprocity theory  is  intended to  explain  how**  the**respect** principle **yields  retributive  principles  of punishment.** What its  supporters have failed to confront,  or  have  confronted  inadequately,  is the  contradiction between  the  directives of the  respect principle  and those of  the retributive prin-  ciple (iii), the principle  of proportionality.  It thus remains unclear how  the  respect principle  and  thejus  talionis can form a coherent  theory of  punishment.**The principle  of  respect obligates us to  respect pesons** as ends in  themselves,  as  choosing  beings  capable  of  autonomous  moral  decision-making.  It forbids any acts which damage or destroy an indi-  vidual's  capacities  for  rational  thought.  In other words, **certain acts,** torture for  example,**are by  their very nature forbidden** by  the  respect  principle. **This is not  true of  the principle  of  proportionality. Any  suffering  the criminal** mind **can** imagine and **inflict,** the **proportionali-  ty** principle**allows in  return.16** Morris comes  to  realize this in  an  article that post-dates his work  on the  reciprocity theory. There he  writes: "**A retributivist might respond  in kind to any wrong done ...** Is  there a retributivist argument  that would bar a like treatment for the  sadist? I do not know it".17 **Retributivism's allowance of proportionate  punishments permits any acts which fulfill this retributive function, even  some  which  the  respect principle  forbids. Hence  the  two  principles  from which the  reciprocity theory  tries to make a coherent  whole actually  lead to contradictory moral directives.**

**(\_\_) Turn:** Intuitions pervade all punishment scales, thus making punishment impermissible because it can never achieve proportionality. **Roebuck**[[20]](#footnote-18) **The range of punishments a jurisdiction makes use of** (that is, its punishment scale), **and** so more specifically, **the punishment that it regards as proportionate** to any particular crime, **requires determining the jurisdiction’s most severe punishment** (that is, according to the above statement of the anchoring problem; alternative statements are considered in Part Three), the punishment to be allocated to what it regards as its most serious crime. But what should this punishment be? Suppose murder is regarded as the most serious crime. Should the punishment for murder be execution, life imprisonment, twenty years’ imprisonment, ten years’ imprisonment, or a fine? How is one to select from such a range, one punishment as the most severe in an actual sentencing system? **Some punishments**, for instance, a fine, may **appear intuitively far too lenient for murder. Others**, **such as execution**, especially where **carried out in** particularly **painful** or degrading **ways**, may **seem intuitively far too harsh**. Obviously, **intuitions** about the appropriate punishment for a given crime **can vary greatly** (and especially in the case of a punishment scale is required precisely so that we can judge the acceptability of our ordinary intuitions, whether they are too harsh or too lenient or quite reasonable. murder), not just within but across societies (Braithwaite and Pettit, 1990: 179). No doubt, they are influenced by existing, especially long-standing, punishment practices in the jurisdiction in question. However, it is not clear why intuitions or commonly-held beliefs should carry any weight.15

**There appears**, however, **to be no**, **non-arbitrary way of getting beyond** such i**ntuition**s, **to select any** one **punishment as the most severe** in the punishment scale of a particular jurisdiction. **Retributivism cannot provide this punishment** (Schafer-Landau 1996: 308; 2000: 191) (and does not even claim to do so).

Thus, punishment can never determine desert because there is no actual scale to determine what one deserves, and intuitions always arbitrarily affect our decisions to punish.

**(\_\_) Turn:** Most individuals who commit crimes are in poorer socioeconomic classes. **Brown**[[21]](#footnote-19)

ES, individual factors, and crime. Another widely held belief amongst **[most] scholars [argue]** is that **poverty is a key cause of crime**. From early Chicago school theorists like Shaw and McKay to researchers today, socioeconomic status has been posited as a key cause of crime (Shaw & McKay, 1942: Sampson & Wilson, 1995; Jarjoura & Triplett, 1997; Wright et al., 1999; Tapia, 2010). Perhaps one of the most ardent defenders of the crime- poverty nexus, Loic Wacquant writes extensively on how **today’s systems of mass incarceration are the result not of individual or group level deficiencies, but the work of the continued influence of poverty, racial ghettoization, and economic forces** (e.g. Wacquant 2007, 2009).  9 Similarly, **a long tradition of ethnographic studies demonstrates how delinquent pathways are often chosen as the result of socioeconomic exclusions from mainstream institutions**, like public education, the legal employment market, and other mainstream institutions (Padilla, 1992; Anderson, 1999; Bourgois, 1995; Sanchez-Jankowski, 2008). This history led Sampson and Wilson (1995: 54) to conclude that understanding crime requires exploration of community-level factors such as the “ecological concentration of ghetto poverty, racial segregation, residential mobility and population turnover, family disruption, and the dimensions of local social organization...especially as they are affected by macrolevel public policies regarding housing, municipal services and employment”.

These people do not garner the benefits of “civil society” in any way, shape or form.

**Murphy**, Jeffrie G. “Marxism and Retribution.” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Spring, 1973), pp. 217-243.

Justice, Benefits, and Community. The retributive theory claims to be grounded on justice; but is it just to punish people who act out of those very motives that society encourages and reinforces? If Bonger is correct, much criminality is motivated by greed, selfishness, and indifference to one's fellows; but does not the whole society encourage motives of greed and selfishness ("making it," "getting ahead"), and does not the competitive nature of the society alienate men from each other and thereby encourage indifference-even, perhaps, what psychiatrists call psychopathy? The moral problem here is similar to one that arises with respect to some war crimes. When you have trained a man to believe that the enemy is not a genuine human person (but only a gook, or a chink), it does not seem quite fair to punish the man if, in a war situation, he kills indiscriminately. For the psychological trait you have conditioned him to have, like greed, is not one that invites fine moral and legal distinctions. There is something perverse in applying principles that presuppose a sense of community in a society which is structured to destroy genuine community.36 Related to this is the whole allocation of benefits in contemporary society. The retributive theory really presupposes what might be called a "gentlemen's club" picture of the relation between man and society i.e., men are viewed as being part of a community of shared values and rules. **The rules benefit all concerned and,** as a kind of debt for the benefits derived, **each man owes obedience to the rules. In the absence of such obedience, he deserves punishment in the sense that he owes payment for the benefits**. For, as rational man, he can see that the rules benefit everyone (himself included) and that he would have selected them in the original position of choice. Now this may not be too far off for certain kinds of criminals-e.g., business executives guilty of tax fraud. (Though even here we might regard their motives of greed to be a function of societal reinforcement.) **But to think that it applies to the typical criminal, from the poorer classes, is to live in a world of social and political fantasy. Criminals typically are not members of a shared community of values with their jailers**; they suffer from what Marx calls alienation. **And they certainly would be hard-pressed to name the benefits for which they are supposed to owe obedience. If justice**, as both Kant and Rawls suggest, **is based on reciprocity, it is hard to see what these persons are supposed to reciprocate for.** Bonger addresses this point in a passage quoted earlier (p. 236): "The oppressed resort to means which they would otherwise scorn.... The basis of social feelings is reciprocity. As soon as this is trodden under foot by the ruling class, the social sentiments of the oppressed become weak towards them."

She might say that poorer individuals reap some benefit from society, but the harms of punishment greatly outweigh the tiny benefit those in lawless areas receive. This means that she pushes us further from societal equilibrium with punishment.

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